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Introduction
Not all intellectual property rights grant the right to
exclude that is indicative of "property rules," as that
term was used by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed in their seminal article.' Some intellectual
property rights are "liability rules" in which the right
holder has an entitlement to compensation for use of
the protected invention, not a right to preclude the
use.2 Although patent laws normally grant a right to
exclude others from use of the protected invention as
a default, most countries' laws allow the government
to convert the patent property rule into a liability rule
through a compulsory license. It has been noted, for
example, that by the end of the 1950s, the U.S. had
issued compulsory licenses covering 40 to 50 thousand patents, including substantial portions of the
patent portfolios of AT&T, General Electric, IBM, and
Xerox. 3 The U.S. Supreme Court recently expressed a
willingness to accept liability rules over injunctions in
4
some patent infringement cases.
The World Trade Organization's (WTO) agreement
on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
recognizes the authority of governments to authorize
the "use of the subject matter of a patent without the
authorization of the right holder, including use by the
government or third parties auithorized by the government"5 Under TRIPS, this authority allows the patent right to be converted from a property rule into
a liability rule, granting the patent holder a right to
"adequate remuneration" for use of the patent rather
than the right to preclude all competition. 6 The right
of countries to use compulsory licenses to promote
access to medicines has been repeatedly reaffirmed in
international law, including through the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
7
issued at the 2001 WTO Ministerial Meeting.
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Assuming that the degree of compensation that is
"adequate" under TRIPS may be significantly lower
than the full scope of profits that could have been
secured through exploiting an exclusive marketing right to its full, a compulsory license may lead
to a reduced incentive for innovation. This potential impact of compulsory licensing is raised repeatedly by industry interests and by many developed

countries were allowed access to generic versions of
medicines protected by patents in rich countries. Even
though the free riding by poor countries in the second
scenario was shown to have a negative effect on the
overall welfare in rich countries (by cutting into the
funds available for R&D to develop future medicines),
Scherer found that overall global welfare is most likely
increased by allowing poor countries access to low-

Some intellectual property rights are 'liability rules,"' in which the
right holder has an entitlement to compensation for use of
the protected invention, not a right to preclude the use.
country governments. In response to recent compulsory licenses for essential medicines by Thailand, for
example, the then European Commissioner for Trade
Peter Mandelson stated that "[tihe use of compulsory
licensing should not become a standard way of doing
business, because systematic recourse to compulsory
licensing would eventually be detrimental to the patent system, and so to innovation and the development
of new medicines " 8 This paper seeks to address that
concern directly. When should recourse to compulsory
licensing become, in Mandelson's words, "systematic?"
And is the need to expand access to patented essential
medicines in a poor country such a case?
In any individual case, choosing to issue a compulsory license involves a trade-off between consumer
benefits today (through greater access at a competitive
price) and consumer benefits in the future (through
greater innovation). Compulsory licensing becomes
more attractive when it is predictable that the former
is greater than the latter. Systematic use of compulsory
licensing likewise may be a justifiable policy response
if there are characteristic features of the market that
result in the benefits from greater access today being
routinely higher than the benefits from increased
incentives for innovation through the exclusive right.
A number of studies have examined the link between
the welfare of people who need medicines and profits
for pharmaceutical firms to fund research and development for new drugs. Many have recognized the need
for poor countries to access low-cost medicines. 9 In a
key contribution in this regard, F. M. Scherer studied
the overall global welfare effects (not just for developing countries) of allowing poor countries a "free ride"
on the innovations spurred by intellectual property
in the global north. He compared a scenario under
which medicines were protected by product patents
all over the world to a scenario under which poor
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATIONS * SUMMER 2009

cost medicines because the marginal utility of income
(the benefit derived from one extra unit of currency) is
greater in poor nations than in rich ones.10
This paper expands on the economic scholarship
on compulsory licensing by showing that in countries
with very high income inequality, which characterizes
many developing countries, market forces may produce incentives for patent holders to maximize profits
by pricing their products to serve only the wealthiest
sliver of the population. Such pricing creates massive
social costs through lack of treatment for the poor
majority. In the balance of benefits and costs of such
a system, the costs are likely to be disproportionately
large. Fundamentally, we argue that where such a
systematic failure of the exclusive right-based patent
systems for needed medicines in developing countries
occurs, compulsory licensing to create open access to
patents on needed medicines in such countries may be
more broadly justified.
We begin with a brief discussion of patents and
monopoly economics, and describe how monopolies,
including those created by patents, raise prices and
increase profits in the average case described in most
basic economics text books. In this average case, the
price increases allowed by patent monopolies is not
necessarily harmful to overall social welfare, assuming
that the increased profits benefits consumers on the
whole through increased incentives to innovate in the
future. We then show that the balance of benefits and
costs changes, however, in a market with highly convex
demand curves. In such a market, the profit-maximizing firm will raise prices much higher to serve only the
portion of the demand curve which is highly inelastic,
creating large deadweight losses because of the substantial fraction of the market unable to afford those
high prices. After presenting these basic economic
premises, we advance to a specific discussion of how
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income inequality produces highly convex demand
curves for essential medicines, comparing the profitmaximizing strategies in South Africa and Norway as
explanatory examples. In the final section, we argue
that situations of highly convex demand curves are
the norm in many developing countries, and therefore
may warrant a systematic compulsory licensing policy,
such as that available under "essential facilities" antitrust standards and license of right patent law clauses,
with means outside of the patent system explored for
incentivizing innovation.

Balancing Costs and Benefits of Essential
Medicine Patent Monopolies
A patent is a government-created right to the exclusive
use of an innovation for a fixed period of time, subject
to various limitations designed to protect public interests. It is granted as an imperfect incentive to create
and share new inventions." The reason that a period of
exclusive use is an incentive to innovate is that it may
enable the patentee to obtain some monopoly profits
during the period of the patent. Granting exclusive use
of an innovation creates costs: typically, the monopoly
price of a product will be higher than if it were competitively provided. In the case of essential medicines
in developing countries, the typical costs and benefits
of exclusive rights are skewed. High inequality in the
demand side ofthe market creates incentives for patent
holders to price out the large majority of the population from access to the product. To the extent that this
problem is systematic - not cabined to a few specific
diseases (such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria) or
to least developed countries - the discussion we offer
below is relevant to a wider set of situations and may

ent for a needed medicine if other medicines cannot
be readily substituted. Such a patent gives its holder
the ability to set price for the good, restrained only
by the extent to which refusals of consumers to pay
the higher price will ultimately decrease profits from
a lower volume of sales.14 The more the demand for
the good is inelastic (meaning that consumers are
less likely to decrease consumption with each price
increase), the higher the price that can be profitably
demanded by the monopolist.
Pricing above marginal costs creates two losses for
consumers. The first loss is a wealth transfer from
consumers to the monopolist, since every unit purchased is at a higher price than consumers would pay
a competitive producer. In the case of an innovative
monopolist, including a monopoly created by a patent,
such a transfer from consumers to the monopolist may
be thought to be the reward for innovation.
The second loss from monopoly pricing is a "deadweight loss" from forgone transactions which would
have taken place at the lower competitive price. These
lost sales are known as "deadweight" because they
do not create surplus for the buyer or seller; the surplus benefit that would have gone to consumers simply disappears, and is not compensated by any gain
to the monopolist. In pharmaceutical markets, this
deadweight loss is often referred to as the problem of
"access": the poor may not purchase a drug product
because of its high price, and as a result, are untreated.
Had the price been lower, more people would have
been able to afford the drug and would have been
treated. Thus, for drugs essential to life and health, the
term deadweight loss created by patented drug pricing
takes on added significance.

have wider policy implications.2

Monopoly Economics
Patents do not always create
monopolies. Many patents give
the holder an exclusive right to
produce a product that has many
substitutes and therefore normal
competitive markets will restrain
13
the patent holders' pricing.
Indeed, there is no guarantee that
a patented item will not be functionally inferior to substitutes,
denying the patent any real market value.
Patents may create monopolies
where there is no effective substitute for the patented product.
This may be the case when the
patent covers the active ingredi-
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Patentsand StandardDemand Curves
Patents on ordinary goods lead to higher prices - but
not necessarily to unreasonably high prices. A monopolist is constrained by the overall market demand
when it is setting price and output. If prices rise too
high, then the monopolist loses too many customers
who may make a decision not to buy the product.
Figure 1 shows the type of demand curve typically
drawn in economics textbooks, with price shown on
the vertical axis, and the quantity of products sold on
the horizontal. To keep things simple, it is assumed
that the cost of production is approximately zero. 15 If
the good were competitively produced, it would have
a price of about zero. There would be zero profits, but
all consumers who are willing and able to pay a price
higher than its average cost of production would buy
it, and there would be no deadweight loss.
The monopolist will pick the profit-maximizing
output for any given demand curve, raising the price
until the decrease in sales offsets the increased profits
per sale. In the above scenario, the seller could sell a
quantity of 99 goods for 1 unit of currency (hereafter,
USD), yielding sales of $99. It can raise the price to $2
and will loose one sale (selling 98 goods instead of 99).
But the resulting increase in income per sale more
than makes up for the loss of demand (enabling earnings of $196). Here, the monopolist will stop raising
prices when it sells 50 goods for $50, earning $2500
in sales. Beyond this point, the seller loses money by
the lost sales at higher prices. Thus, the profit-maximizing price, given this demand curve, would be
about $50. Because all of the consumers would purchase the product at the competitive price, the area
below the demand curve and to the right of 50 units is
marked as "deadweight loss." The wealth transfer from

consumer to producer is marked "producer surplus."
An important point is that producer surplus (2500)
is about twice as large as the DWL (1250), so that it
provides a strong incentive for innovation, compared
to current welfare losses owing to the deadweight loss.

Convex Demand Curve
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Patents and Highly Convex Demand Curves
The profit maximizing pricing strategies for a firm
with a monopoly are altered by the shape and slope
of the demand curve. The slope of the demand curve
may be affected by the elasticity of demand. A monopolist will be more restrained if consumers are more
willing to shift to an inferior substitute or do without
the good as prices rise. More elasticity in the demand
market results in a demand curve that is more flat on
the horizontal plane; less elasticity results in a steeper
demand curve. A perfectly inelastic demand curve,
meaning that consumers will not curb their demand at
any price, will be vertical. A horizontal demand curve
would mean that the smallest price increase would
eliminate all consumer purchases.
Most demand curves are not straight lines, as in
Figure 1, but rather have some element of convexity
or concavity. Convexity indicates that some segment
of the market (the flatter part of the demand curve)
will be highly elastic - giving up the purchase with a
slight price increase. Another segment of the market
is likely to be more inelastic - willing to pay much
higher prices for access. And some part of the market
will exist on points along the curve between these two
extremes.
Suppose that the demand for a good is highly convex, as illustrated in Figure 2. This figure is drawn with
-a convex demand curve and so that the area under
the demand curve is the same as the area under the
demand curve in Figure 1.16 Given
this demand curve, if the product
were offered competitively, the
surplus in the market would be
5000, just the same as the competitive market given the demand
curve drawn in Figure 1.
The shape of the demand
curve changes the profit-maximizing price in a predictable
way. Attempting to capture a significant portion of the flat/elastic part of the demand curve is
unprofitable. There, small price
increases knock large numbers of
consumers out of the market. The
81
89
97
monopolist will target its price
toward the steep end of the curve
where large price increases will
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cause minimal decreases in additional sales. Thus, the
profit-maximizing price given the demand curve in
Figure 2 would be almost 200, four times higher than
the case of the linear demand curve. In this case, the
deadweight loss of 1835 is almost exactly the same as
the profits, unlike in the linear case, where the deadweight loss of 1250 is exactly half as large as the profits
which are 2500. The result is that only a small proportion of the possible purchasers (about 10%) would buy
the product.
To help illustrate the effect of convexity on the deadweight loss to profit ratio, consider a demand curve
of the form p = 1 - qn, where p c (0,1). As shown in
the Appendix, the ratio of deadweight loss to profit
increases as n decreases (i.e., as the demand curve
becomes more convex). The converse also holds, so
that the ratio of deadweight loss to profit decreases as
n increases. For more complicated real-world demand
curves, there will not generally be a single measure
of convexity, but the general principle applies that
greater convexity will typically drive the monopolist
to serve a much smaller segment of the market and
produce comparatively large deadweight losses.
The trade-off between incentives for innovation vs.
current deadweight losses for convex demand curves
is not as favorable for the patent system as in cases
with linear demand curves. That is, traditional patent protection has a smaller effect on innovation than
in the linear demand case, and at the same time, the
deadweight losses are larger.
There is no established ratio of deadweight losses
to profit at which economists would agree that unrestrained monopoly pricing of the patented product is
undesirable. The straight-line demand curve drawn
in Figure 1 might be thought to be somehow "average." The rules relating to patents - including their
twenty-year term - have grown in developed countries to reflect a societal willingness to trade-off incentives for innovation (via profits) with deadweight loss
in the average case. In effect, the balance has been
established that, on average, 20 years of exclusive

exploitation of an innovation grants enough incentive to innovate; the implication is that longer patent
duration would increase deadweight losses more than
it would spur on innovation.'7 For markets which have
much less favorable DWL/profits ratios, however, the
marginal cost of extending patent protection is much
higher for a given amount of benefit, and the optimal
period of patent protection - or the type of protection
offered - must be less. Indeed, if the DWL/profit ratio
is sufficiently unfavorable, the optimal period of exclusion through patent protection will be zero.
It is well known that the optimal patent design should
vary depending on market demand and cost characteristics, 8 and therefore the conclusion that the standard
patent rules are mal-adapted to markets with convex
demand curves will not be surprising. However, if one
could identify an important class of markets characterized systematically by highly convex demand curves,
there would be a strong case for altering the operation
of patents in those markets. As we show in the next
section, markets for needed medicines in developing
countries constitute precisely such a class.
EssentialMedicine Patents in Developing Countries
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines essential medicines as "those that satisfy the priority health
care needs of the population.' 19 In creating its model
list of essential medicines that should be available in
every country, however, the WHO considers the cost
of accessing the drug and generally excludes patented
medicines with very high prices. 20 We are concerned
here with the access problems related to those medicines that meet the WHO's definition of being "essential" in that they address priority health needs, and in
addition are (1) subject to patents or other exclusive
marketing rights,21 and (2) for which there are no
adequate substitutes. The lack of substitutes means
that the exclusive marketing right creates an effective
monopoly. The essential nature of the medicine for life
or health means that people requiring the medicine
will generally be willing to spend whatever resources
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Filgure 4.1
ARV Demand if Price = 5% Income

Quartiy (unts in 550 000 people)

are available to them to buy that medicine. 22 The relative unlimited willingness of patients to pay for the
drug means that, in the sector of the population that
must pay for the medicine through private means
(which is large in developing countries), 23 the demand
24
curve is likely to be a function of ability to pay.
The distribution of income and wealth in developing countries tends to be extremely uneven. There are
a few very wealthy families, with extensive holdings
and high income; at the other extreme, a large number of households have essentially no wealth and low
incomes. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of income
in South Africa in the form of average per capita
income for each decile of the population in 2000. The
richest 10% earned 58% of all income. Put another
way, the richest 10% earned an average of $29,626 a
year, more than 80 times the average income of the
poorest 10% (only $362).
High inequality in ability to pay in a country will
produce highly convex demand curves for essential
goods. Figure 4.1 is a demand curve for AIDS medicine in South Africa constructed according to the
assumptions that (1) ability to pay is proportional to
annual income, and (2) the incidence of the disease is
equal among all income levels. This, in turn, implies
a demand curve having proportions very similar to
that in Figure 2, for which we demonstrated that the
deadweight loss created by monopoly pricing of the
good are very large compared to the incentives for
innovation enabled by such pricing. The shape of the
demand curve can be used to estimate the profit maximizing behavior of a monopolist in this market. Figure
4.1 assumes that people needing AIDS treatment in
South Africa will purchase an antiretroviral if the cost
is 5% of their income, which is at the outer edge of
what South Africans in the top 20% of income earners
spend on all of their out-of-pocket medical expendiPHARMACEUTICAL REGULATIONS * SUMMER 2009

Fgu re 4.2
Revenue Per Quantity Sold
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10

tures.2 9 According to 2006 UNAIDS data, 5.5 million
people live with HIV/AIDS in South Africa.30 Since we
assume that HIV prevalence is uniform across income
deciles,31 each decile contains 550,000 people who will
need antiretroviral treatment. If a firm prices its antiretroviral at $1,481 per patient per year (5% of the per
capita GDP distributed to the highest income decile)32
then 550,000 people will buy it. In order to sell to a
greater proportion of the population, the price must
fall considerably - people in need of treatment in the
second-highest income decile will buy the medicine if
it is priced at $396, and half of the people in need of
treatment can purchase an antiretroviral if it is priced
at $92. In order to sell to all people with AIDS who
need treatment, the price would have to be lowered to
33
$18 per patient per year
Figure 4.2 shows the total sales revenue a firm will
gain if it sells at each price on the demand curve. The
firm maximizes its sales in South Africa by selling at the
price that only the top 10% can afford. 34 At this price,
the firm makes $814.6 million in total revenue. If the
firm lowers its price to be able to make sales to 20% of
the affected individuals (at $396 per patient), then it
will sell twice as many medicines at a price less than half
of the profit-maximizing price, earning substantially
less ($435.6 million). As the monopolist continues to
cut prices and raise production, revenues fall further at
almost every level of output and corresponding price. In
other words, the firm will maximize its profits by setting
a price unaffordable for at least 90% of people in need.
To understand the effect that South Africa's inequitable income distribution has on the pricing and
output decision of a monopolist in that country, compare it to the corresponding figures for Norway, which
has one of the most equitable income distributions.
Constructing a similar demand curve based on the
assumption that people will buy a medicine at prices
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up to 5% of their income yeilds a flatter, less convex
demand curve (Figure 5.1).
The less convex Norwegian demand curve produces
incentives for the firm to serve a larger percentage of
the population through its pricing. Figure 5.2 shows the
total revenue a firm will receive if it sells at the price
affordable to each decile of the population. If it sets a
price at which only the top 10% of Norwegians will buy,
it will earn total revenues that are much lower than it
will receive if it lowers its price to one which a higher
percentage of the population can afford. The seller will
maximize profits by selling at the price affordable to all
but the poorest 20% of the population.
Because the monopolist's demand curve is flatter, the
firm cannot make up lost consumption by the majority
of the population with very high price increases at the
steeper end of the curve. Thus, the monopolist in this
economy will maximize profits by selling at the price
where 80% of the HIV+ population can afford to purchase the product (Figure 5.2).
The table above shows the data used for graphs
4.1 through 5.2. Although at every income decile the
affordable price in Norway exceeds that in South
Africa, this does not mean that the profit-maximizing
price is below that of South Africa. As the table shows,
the profit-maximizing price in South Africa under our
assumptions is $1,481, slightly higher than the profitmaximizing price in Norway. Of course, at this price in
South Africa, only the wealthiest 10% would be able to
afford the medicine while in Norway 80% of the population would have access.
More generally, at high levels of inequality within
a country, a monopolist will maximize its revenue
by selling at a high price affordable to few people. In
countries with more equitable income distribution, a

monopolist will maximize revenue by selling at a lower
price to a greater number of consumers. Appendix 2
further illustrates this point with demand and revenue
curves similar to the ones above for 12 nations with
varying degrees of income inequality (with Gini coefficients ranging from 26.4 to 63.3).
Income inequality exists to a greater or lesser extent
in every developing country, where a small minority
often earns salaries that compare to those of advanced
industrialized countries and the majority live in poverty.3 8 This inequality creates incentives for an unrestrained monopoly supplier ineluctably to set drugs
prices high. The problem is that relatively rich people,
though few, are able to pay so much more for their
drugs that it is more profitable for a company to serve
them only. The greater the inequality of the income
or wealth distribution, the more severe this problem
becomes, with greater individual ability to pay on the
39
part of the very rich pushing the price up.
One implication of this analysis is that it may be perfectly rational for a company to set very similar prices
in rich and poor countries, because the poor countries
are likely to have high income inequality leading to
highly convex demand curves. One area where there
are country-to-country price differences is for antiretroviral drugs to treat HIV/AIDS. Price discrimination
in this limited area is primarily the result of a vocal
activist campaign coupled with the introduction of
generic competition.40 Outside of this limited area,
drug prices in very poor countries are often not particularly low.41 Indeed, middle-income countries with
high inequality, such as Brazil and Mexico, often pay
higher prices for patented drugs than high-income
countries with lower inequality, such as the U.K. and
2
Sweden.4
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Toward Open License Strategies

discrimination are not the poor but rather the well
organized (e.g., insurance providers, the government,
or other large purchasers). With the exception of discrimination in prices between large purchasers, it is
often difficult for companies to charge different prices
for different consumers within a country because of
the ease with which one segment would access prices
intended for another.47 Likewise, price discrimination
focused on discounts to government agencies, with the
assumption that such agencies will service the poor, is
likely to fail to ameliorate the conditions of large numbers of working people who earn too much money to
access government-operated clinics but earn too little,
and have too little insurance, to afford the extremely
high prices being targeted to the top sliver of income
earners.
The more direct, effective, and available tool to
accomplish lower prices in developing countries with
high-income inequality is for such countries to grant
open licenses, permitting competition by any qualified
supplier, for essential medicine patents. Such licenses
maximize the ability of competitive markets to push
prices down as close as possible to the marginal cost
of producing the drugs. The key will be for countries
to adopt legal standards that will quickly and easily recognize a duty to license intellectual property
rights, a refusal of which would trigger an open license
remedy.
One such source of legal authority for open licenses
may be found in "essential facility," "refusal to deal,"
and related competition law doctrines. On October

As shown above, in the case of needed medicines in
developing countries where highly convex demand
curves are the norm, benefits from lower prices may
exceed any potential losses owing to reduced future
innovation. This is because demand for needed medicines in developing countries has very special properties, contributing to larger deadweight loss relative to
extra producer surplus when monopolies restrict output and raise prices. In these circumstances, the use
of compulsory licensing becomes one obvious remedy
to problems created by the indiscriminate enforcement of property rules through patent laws in situations where they do not increase social welfare.43 Converting the property rule to a liability rule through a
compulsory license allows a country to change most
of the deadweight loss into consumer surplus by using
competition to achieve the lowest possible price while
providing a measured contribution to research and
development expenses through a royalty payment.Evidence that pharmaceutical companies do not,
and lack incentives to, grant significant discounts in
poor countries contradicts the prescription offered
by Patricia Danzon and Adrian Towse, who suggest
that permitting confidential rebates to developing
countries will result in Ramsey pricing strategies with
higher prices in developed countries than in those that
are poorer.45 Our analysis above suggests that this will
not be the case for developing countries with unequal
6
wealth distributions.4
While price discrimination is possible within a country, in practice the consumers who benefit from such
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATIONS - SUMMER
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16, 2003, the South African Competition Commis-
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sion issued a declaration finding that pharmaceutical firms GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim
violated the South African Competition Act by refusing to grant licenses for patents on essential AIDS
medicines."8 The Commission found that the drug
patents of the companies were "essential facilities" for
which it was economically feasible to grant competitors access,4 9 and that the refusal to grant licenses to
generic firms caused an anti-competitive effect that
"outweighs its technological, efficiency or other procompetitive gain "5 As a remedy, the Commission
sought "an order authorising any person to exploit the
patents to market generic versions of the respondents
patented medicines or fixed dose combinations that
require these patents, in return for the payment of a
reasonable royalty."51 In our view, the South African
Competition Commission correctly weighed the benefits and costs of monopoly pricing in that case, and
indeed, our analysis suggests that there may be merit
in a wider application of this approach.
The solution of compulsory licensing, of course,
leads to new problems - in particular that the firms'
incentives to innovate may be weakened. While this is
true, one of the points made here is that for markets in
which firms can expect demand to be highly convex which is likely to be true in markets for medicines in
most developing countries - the patent system will be
ineffectual in delivering much innovation. It is not just
that the countries are poor - it is that extreme income
inequality leads to a highly convex demand curve.
Ultimately, the problem of finding an adequate and
equitable mechanism to fund research and development for medicines in developing countries must be
found elsewhere. While compulsory licensing in developing countries is likely to do little to hurt the existing
(negligible) incentives to innovate produced by such
markets,52 it clearly would not help. The most difficult problem here is that of so-called "Type III,7 or
"neglected" diseases, which are mainly prevalent in lowand medium-income countries, and for which there is
no substantial market in high-income countries5 3 For
these diseases, patent exclusivity offers relatively little
incentive to invest in R&D, despite the potentially large
health gains that might be realized.54 Evidently, some
other system for encouraging innovation for developing countries is required, such as government-funded
basic research, global research and development pools,
rewards and prizes, or other strategies. 5

Appendix 1
Given the inverse demand curve p 1- qf. with q and p
both between 0 and I, the profit maximizing quantity and
price are given by
and
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DWI+

DWL

I

n n1

(n + I

n (1

I

n(+I

It is easy to verify that as n decreases, this ratio increases.

Appendix 2 - Graphic Representation of
Relationship Between Inequality and the
Revenue-Maximizing Point of Output
Here we present a series of tables and graphs to illustrate how a monopolist's profit-maximizing combination of price and output varies with the level of
inequality in an economy. A pharmaceutical firm with
unconstrained pricing power will maximize profits by
selling a greater quantity at a relatively affordable price
in economies with a fairly equitable income distribution, but will maximize revenues in less equitable economies by selling a smaller quantity at a higher price.
Using real GDP and population statistics from the
World Bank's development database, UNAIDS estimations of people living with HIV/AIDS, and income-bydecile statics from the World Institute for Development
Economics Research of the United Nations University
(UNU-WIDER) database, we have constructed a
series of demand and total revenue graphs similar to
the examples of South Africa and Norway in the body
of the paper (Graphs 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2).
We first calculate per capita income for each decile.
Assuming that people will be willing and able to purchase a medicine priced at 5% of their income, we
derive a set of demand curves for 12 nations of varying
levels of income inequality. They are displayed in the
order of most equal (as measured by the Gini coefficient) to the least. As inequality increases, the demand
curves become more convex.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that disease
prevalence is equal among income deciles. We construct
graphs oftotal revenue (quantity demanded times price,
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for each price along the demand curve) against the
quantity sold. The revenue-maximizing price/quantity
combination in the two most equitable economies in
our sample, Finland and France, is that in which 80%
of the people who need the medicines will obtain them.
(In each of the tables in Appendix 2, the maximum revenue and corresponding quantity sold are highlighted.)
For countries with higher Gini coefficients and more
convex demand curves, the revenue-maximizing point
moves leftward, indicating that monopolies in these
countries will earn the most money by charging prices
that smaller and smaller segments of the population
can afford. In the most unequal countries, monopolists
clearly maximize revenue by selling at high prices to
only the wealthiest 10% of the population.
The UNU-WIDER database on measurements of
equality is the most complete compilation of inequality data available, but it contains observations from a
variety of sources. We have taken steps to ensure that
the data used in this Appendix is comparable from one
country to another. Many other studies on equality
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have suffered from problems arising from improper
cross-country comparisons. An excellent discussion
of common problems in studies of inequality, and a
guide on how to improve on cross-country comparisons is found in Deininger and Squire (1996).
In each country, surveys were conducted at the household level, then adjusted for the differing size of households in order to derive distribution-per-person. In all
of our observations, data is taken from surveys which
sampled the entire population, including all geographic
areas and all age groups. We ignored studies that only
surveyed urban populations or a subgroup of the entire
population (i.e., employees or people between the ages
of 15 and 64). We used only data points on distribution
of income, ignoring data points measuring the distribution of consumption. Finally, the UNU-WIDER database gives each data point a numeric quality rating from
1 (highest) to 4 (lowest). We only included data rated
1 or 2, which indicate that the authors of the database
were able to verify the income concept and the survey
method (1), or at least one or the other (2).

SYMPOSIUM

Year 2000

Gini=26.4

r-9L.N
% Income by Decile
23.20
13.40
i 1.50
10.30
9.30
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7.50
6.60
5.70
4.30

%lnc(GDP) /(Pop/ 10)
% Income x GDP
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Ave Inc. x 5%
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PWAs
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Ave Inc. x 5%
2,480
1,691
1,353
1,240
1,015
902
789
676
564
451

PWAs
12,000
24,000
36,000
48,000
60,000
72,000
84,000
96,000
108,000
120,000

Total Revenue
29,763,064
40,585,997
48,703,196
59,526,129
60,878,996
64,937,595
66,290,462
64,937,595
60,878,996
54,114,663
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LA7VUA
%Income by Decile
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11.41
9.70
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7,14
6.10
4.74
1.66

Year 1999

Gini=35.0
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Ave Inc. x 5%
465
240
188
160
143
130
118
101
78
27

760
1,520
2,280
3,040
3,800
4,560
5.320
6,080
6,840

Total Revenue
353,646
364,798
429,59 I
486,869
542,632
593,138
627,371
612,411
535,219

7,600

208,899

PWAs
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Gini=44.

VENEZUELA
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Ave Inc. x 5%
788
398
298
236
193
158
127
100
73
39

PWAs
11,000
22,000
33,000
44.000
55,000
66,000
77,000
88,000
99,000
110,000

Total Revenue
8,665,272
8,754,570
9,829,655
10,373,184
10,622,299
10,404,390
9,788,925
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7,272,576
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Ave Inc. x 5%
382
170
124
96

Year 2000
PWAs
8,200
16,400
24.600
32,800

Total Revenue
3,135,047
2,788,931
3,038,582
3,145,286
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35
24
12

41,000
49,200
57,400
65,600
73,800
82,000

3,126,366
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2,322,707
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967,866
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Ave Inc. x 5%
1330
460
309
234
186
147
116
89
64
34

Year 2000
PWAs
16,0w
32,000
48,000
64,000
80,000
96,000
112,000
128,000
144,000
160,000

Total Revenue
2 t ,277,773
14,712,591
14,814,212
14,997,406
14,872,549
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5,410,927
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Year 2001

Gini=61.2
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% Income by Decile
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Year 2000

Gini=63.3

BOLOVOA
% Income x GDP
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1,420,570,742
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Ave Inc. x 5%
246
85
55
41
29
21
14
9
4
I

PWAs
490
980
1,470
1,960
2,450
2,940
3,430
3,920
4,410
4,900

Total Revenue
120,367
83,697
81,217
79,495
71,547
61,253
48,431
33,632
18,141
5,742
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